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Application of cryptanalysis methods to some symmetric key primitives
Anahid Khajooeizadeh
Block ciphers and hash functions are important cryptographic primitives that are used to
secure the exchange of critical information. With the continuous increase in computational
power available to attackers, information security systems including their underlying prim-
itives need continuous improvements. Various cryptanalysis methods are used to examine
the strength and weakness of hash functions and block ciphers.
In this work, we study the Lesamnta-512 and DHA-256 hash functions and the LAC
authenticated encryption scheme. In particular, we study the resistance of the underlying
block cipher of the Lesamnta-512 hash function against impossible differential attacks and
the resistance of the DHA-256 compression function against collision attacks. We also
study MAC forgery attacks against LAC. Throughout our analysis, we use different auto-
mated methods to facilitate our analysis. For the cryptanalysis of Lesamnta-512, two au-
tomated methods are studied for ﬁnding an impossible differential path with the maximum
length. Using the obtained impossible differential path, impossible differential cryptanal-
ysis of Lesamnta-512 is performed for 16 rounds. For the DHA-256 hash function, we
used an algebraic method to ﬁnd collisions for its 17-step reduced compression function
iii
by deriving difference equations for each step and then solving them when the conditions
for collisions are imposed on these equations. For LAC, the differential behavior of the
different operations of the cipher is represented into a set of linear equations. Then, a
Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) approach is used to ﬁnd a high probability
characteristic. This characteristic is then used to perform a forgery attack on LAC.
iv
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With the heavy reliance of our society on computers and the rising popularity of the Inter-
net, the importance of data validation and authentication is on the rise. Cryptographic hash
functions play a great role in securing modern information and computing systems. They
are used as building blocks to achieve data integrity, authentication and non-repudiation as
part of the digital signature schemes, message authentication codes and many other secu-
rity schemes. On one hand, the steady increase in computational power allows us to deploy
hash functions, among other cryptographic primitives, in many security applications. On
the other hand, it also allows hackers to brute force weaker primitives and practically ex-
ecute complex cryptanalytic techniques that were thought of as impractical in the past. In
2005, two commonly used hash functions were attacked successfully. Wang et al. released
details on how to break the widely used MD5 hash function and presented examples for
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colliding messages [29]. Afterwards, a theoretical attack was presented on SHA-1. This
attack can ﬁnd colliding pairs with complexity much less than predicted by its designed
security parameters [28]. As a result, a continuous, and indeed challenging, development
of hash functions is required in order to design more secure hash functions and be able to
compute more precise security bounds. On November 2007, the National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) announced the SHA-3 competition in order to select a new
hash function standard that addresses the issues in SHA-1 and MD5 [12]. DHA (Double
Hash Algorithm)-256 hash function is one of the early designs introduced to strengthen
the SHA-2 hash function. There are two main differences introduced in DHA compared to
SHA-2. First, the message expansion formula is different and it has been changed in a way
to use the nearest previous messages in its iterations rather than the far steps. This helps
the message expansion to use more messages from previous steps and therefore makes the
search for collisions harder. Lesamnta is another new family of hash functions submitted
to the NIST SHA-3 competition. The Lesamnta hash function family includes four al-
gorithms: Lesamnta-224/256/384/512. For each algorithm, the Merkle-Damgard domain
extension with an output function is adopted [9]. Since the inner functions of Lesamnta are
similar to the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [10], many optimized software and
hardware implementation techniques for AES are also applicable to Lesamnta.
Poor composition of encryption schemes and authentication codes (MAC) can lead to
dramatic security failure of the underlying security systems even when each of these prim-
itives is secure by itself [3], [19], [27], [17]. Authenticated encryption schemes are prim-
itives which simultaneously provide conﬁdentiality, integrity, and authenticity assurances
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on the data; decryption is combined in single step with integrity validation. These attributes
are provided under a single, easy to use interface. Some applications require us to be able to
securely use encryption schemes and authentication schemes together and provide authen-
ticity and conﬁdentiality for both secret and non-secret data (commonly referred to as the
associated data). Thus authenticated encryption schemes with associated data were intro-
duced to fulﬁl this requirement [26]. Based on the importance of the composition modes on
the security of the information systems and renewed interest in the design and cryptanalysis
of secure authenticated encryption schemes after the breaches on their plain combination,
NIST funded the CAESAR competition (Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Se-
curity, Applicability, and Robustness) to speciﬁcally provide the security community with
candidates for dedicated authenticated encryption primitives.
The LAC lightweight authentication encryption scheme is one of the candidates submit-
ted to the CAESAR competition. The structure of LAC is based on ALE [7]. The primitive
used in LAC as the back-end block cipher is a modiﬁed version of LBlock, called LBlock-s
which is another lightweight block cipher.
In this thesis we study the three above mentioned cryptographic functions and schemes
(Lesamnta-512, DHA-256 and LAC) and investigate three attacks on them. More precisely,
• We present some cryptanalytic results on DHA-256 and Lesamnta-512. In particu-
lar, we study the resistance of the underlying block cipher of the Lesamnta-512 hash
function against impossible differential attacks, the resistance of DHA-256 compres-
sion function against collision attacks, and we study MAC forgery attacks against
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LAC. Throughout our analysis, we use different semi-automated methods to facil-
itate our analysis. For the cryptanalysis of Lesamnta-512, two automated methods
are studied for ﬁnding an impossible differential path with the maximum length. Us-
ing the obtained impossible differential path, impossible differential cryptanalysis of
Lesamnta-512 is performed for 16 rounds.
• We study forgery attacks on LAC. In particular, the differential behaviour of the dif-
ferent operations of the cipher is represented into a set of linear equations. Then,
a Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) approach is used to ﬁnd a high prob-
ability differential path. This path is then utilized to perform a forgery attack on
LAC.
1.2 Contributions
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We thoroughly study the Lesamnta-512 hash function and its underlying block ci-
pher. Automated methods for ﬁnding the long impossible differential paths (the Ma-
trix method and the Uniﬁed method) are studied. Based on our analysis, the Uniﬁed
method turns out to be more suitable for application on Lesamnta-512. Using this
method, a 16 round impossible differential path is found for the Lesamnta-512 block
cipher.
• We present an algebraic attack to ﬁnd collisions on reduced round version of the
DHA-256 compression function.
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• We present a forgery attack on the LAC authenticated encryption scheme. The attack
was found by utilizing a Mixed Integer Linear programming approach to ﬁnd a hight
probability characteristic, and then we search for a high probability differential that
follows the same set of active S-boxes within the found characteristic.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In the next section, we present related work
and some background that is required to understand the work presented throughout the
thesis. In Chapter 3, Lesamnta-512 is studied where automated methods are used in order
to ﬁnd impossible differential paths with maximum length. Also, an algebraic attack to ﬁnd
collisions for a reduced round version of the DHA-256 compression function is presented.
In Chapter 4, we present our forgery attack on the LAC authenticated encryption scheme.
Finally, in Chapter 5 we present our conclusion and some possible future work directions.
5
Chapter 2
Related Work and Background
In this chapter, we brieﬂy review some related work and provide background knowledge
required to understand the work done in this thesis. First, we brieﬂy review the security
properties of cryptographic hash functions and authenticated encryption schemes. Then we
provide background on differential cryptanalysis in general and impossible differential in
particular. Finally, some automated methods that proved to be useful in the cryptanalysis
of symmetric key primitives are described.
2.1 Properties of Cryptographic Hash Functions
2.1.1 Introduction
Hash functions are powerful tools in the design of techniques for protecting the authenticity
of information. Typically, hash functions map larger domains to smaller ranges, referred to
as digital ﬁngerprints. This domain should be small enough in order to be able to efﬁciently
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store it. In cryptography, hash functions are also used in authentication schemes where a
hash function is combined with a secret key to form an authentication code (MAC). In Mes-
sage Authentication Codes, the secret key is used in the compression process. Therefore it
can be used to achieve data integrity (e.g., to ensure that the data has not been changed by
an intruder or by a virus), and message authentication at the same time. The security of a
MAC is dependent on the cryptographic strength of the underlying hash function and also
on the size of its hash output and key. Additionally, hash functions are used in message
ﬁngerprinting, i.e., the hash value is used as the digital ﬁngerprint of the message hashed
since there is a low probability that two different messages hash to the same value. In case
an intruder ﬁnds such messages, a collision is found and the hash function is broken. An-
other use of hash functions is in detecting any data corruptions in the received ciphertext.
This is useful in verifying the integrity of ﬁles or messages and identifying them reliably.
Hash functions are also widely used in digital signature schemes where a user attaches a
code to their message as a signature. This is achieved by hashing the message and encrypt-
ing the produced hash with the user private key. Therefore the message can be veriﬁed
and undeniable, i.e., the user who signed the message cannot deny this action. Also, hash
functions are used in password veriﬁcation schemes where it is not secure to save all the
users’ password or sensitive information in cleartext. This is achieved by storing the pass-
words’ hash values instead and comparing the hash values in the veriﬁcation process. In
some proof-of-work systems, hash functions are used to verify that a work has been done
by the user [13]. Other usages of hash functions are in pseudo random number generations
and deriving keys from another key or password. For a cryptographic hash function, it is
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assumed that the description of h must be publicly known and should not require any secret
information for its operation. It is also assumed that the argumentX can be of any arbitrary
length and the result h(X) has a ﬁxed length of z bits. Furthermore, cryptographic hash
functions should satisfy the following properties [24]:
• H is a hash function with z-bit output (z is a positive integer) if H is a deterministic
function that takes an arbitrary length input and outputs a binary string of length z,
i.e., H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}z.
• A hash function H is pre-image resistant (one-way) if, for a random string h, it is
infeasible for an attacker, having h, to ﬁnd m such that H(m) = h.
• A hash function H is second-preimage resistant if it is infeasible for an attacker
having a random string m to ﬁnd m′ = m such that H(m) = H(m′).
• A hash function H is collision resistant if it is infeasible for an attacker to ﬁnd m′ =
m such that H(m) = H(m′).
• The hash function must be collision resistant: this means that it is “hard” to ﬁnd two
distinct messages that hash to the same result.
Degree of Difﬁculty
If H maps the input vector A to output vector B then there are 2z possible values for B
considering that H has z-bits as output. The complexity of attacks is based on the number
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of the hash function computations required to success. The complexities of generic pre-
image, second pre-image, and collision attacks are as follows:
• Pre-image attack. In this attack, the attacker must ﬁnd a message that produces a
given a hash. Assuming the attacker uses an exhaustive search to ﬁnd this message,
the attack would have a complexity of 2z.
• Second pre-image attack. The attacker must ﬁnd another message that has the same
hash value as a given message. Assuming the attacker uses an exhaustive search to
ﬁnd this message, the attack would have a complexity of 2z.
• Collision attack. The adversary must ﬁnd any two messages with the same hash
value. Based on the birthday paradigm, the complexity of the collision ﬁnding attack
is 2z/2.
2.2 The Birthday Paradigm
The birthday paradigm [24] states that in a random group of 23 people, the probability of
ﬁnding two that share the same birthday is about 50%. In what follows, we sketch a simple
proof for this paradigm. The chance that two people share the same birthday is 1/365. The
probability that two have different birthdays is 1−1/365 = 364/365. Having z people, we
conclude that we have z(z − 1)/2 pair of people. Therefore, the probability that all these
pairs have different birthdays is (364/365)z(z−1)/2. The probability of ﬁnding at least one
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pair that shares a birthday is given by
1− (364/365)z(z−1)/2 (1)
For z = 1.2
√
365 (253 pairs), Eq. 1 evaluates to 50%. This can be used for the hash
function attack as well in order to ﬁnd two messages hashing to the same value. Having
a hash function H with z-bit output, then the complexity of ﬁnding collisions under this
attack would be z = 1.2
√
2z.
2.3 Cryptographic Properties of Authenticated Encryp-
tion Schemes
An important challenge in secure communication is preventing an unauthorized user from
modifying the data going through the channel. Cryptography can be used to solve this
problem. Generally, the authentication problem is different from the privacy problem, i.e.,
preventing an unauthorized user from extracting information from a communication chan-
nel. For entity authentication, it is important to identify the source and/or destination of a
communication. Authenticated Encryption schemes are cryptographic primitives that are
useful when conﬁdentiality, integrity and origin authenticity of the data are required at the
same time. Data integrity is not achieved with encryption only. Therefore, another authen-
tication scheme is required to verify that the message has not been modiﬁed by an attacker
using a code speciﬁc to the original user. This code is called a Message Authentication
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Code (MAC). There are several cryptographic properties we would like to achieve in au-
thentication encryption schemes. One property is indistinguishability. Assuming that the
attacker has two messages and an encryption of one of them. If the attacker is not able
to distinguish between them then the indistinguishability goal is met in that scheme. The
weakest scenario is indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack, called IND-CPA [4].
In this scenario the attacker has access to the scheme and therefore is able to encrypt, i.e.,
query this scheme with any two pairs of messages (m0,m1) and receive their encrypted
value. The attacker wins if she is able to guess which one of the messages the encrypted
value belongs to.
A stronger scenario is indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attack, called IND-
CCA [4]. It is also assumed that the attacker has repeated access to the encryption and
decryption schemes. The attacker encrypts two messages (m0,m1) and receives an en-
crypted value. Then the attacker chooses a random ciphertext and guesses its correspond-
ing plaintext value. The attacker wins if she is able to guess which one of the messages the
encrypted value belongs to.
The two other security notions are integrity of plaintexts (INT-PTXT) and integrity of
ciphertexts (INT-CTXT) [4]. In INT-PTXT, it should be computationally infeasible to ﬁnd
a ciphertext that when decrypted generates a plaintext that the sender has not encrypted.
However, in INT-CTXT it should be computationally infeasible to ﬁnd a ciphertext that has
not been generated by the sender. INT-CTXT security implies INT-PTXT security.
There are three approaches to authenticated encryption: Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) (en-
crypt ﬁrst and then use the authentication key to compute the calculate the ciphertext tag),
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Encrypt-and-MAC (E&M) (encrypt message and generate tag from the original plaintext)
and MAC-then-Encrypt (MtE) (ﬁrst the tag is calculated and both the message and tag are
encrypted). In [19], it is shown that EtM is the secure approach compared to MtE and
E&M.
There are some downsides to all these approaches. First, instead of one single block,
two schemes are being used for authentication and encryption. Therefore not only this
will have more complexity but also two different keys are required, one for each scheme
meaning that the processing at the end user will be increased and this slows down the
process. Additionally, just attaching and combining an encryption and an authentication
scheme together will not necessarily provide a secure authenticated encryption scheme
even if each scheme is proven to be secure [4] [19].
For these reasons, researchers are trying to design AE schemes that is not only efﬁcient
and secure but also uses the same key for both encryption and authentication. In order to do
so, one approach is to introduce new modes of operation. These modes are designed using
a block cipher and based on the assumption that the underlying block cipher is secure, i.e.,
it cannot be distinguished from a random permutation. For example, some ISO standard
modes are Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of operation, Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM)
and Offset Codebook Mode (OCB) [2]. Another approach is to use a stream cipher and use
a key for encryption and another for authentication, which can be generated by dividing the
keystream into two parts [23].
The renewed interest in design and cryptanalysis of secure authenticated encryption
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schemes, especially after the breaches caused by the use of their plain combination moti-
vated NIST to fund the CAESAR competition (Competition for Authenticated Encryption:
Security, Applicability, and Robustness) to speciﬁcally provide dedicated authenticated en-
cryption schemes.
Generally, algorithms providing conﬁdentiality and authenticity can be divided into two
categories: authenticated encryption (AE) and authenticated encryption with associated
data (AEAD). Each encrypts and authenticates plaintext data (in addition to authenticated-
only data), which produces ciphertext with an authentication code. In the AEAD modes,
separate data is authenticated, known as associated authenticated data or AAD. The associ-
ated authenticated data is only authenticated and not encrypted so it can be communicated
unencrypted in cleartext. AEAD schemes are useful in applications where some informa-
tion need to be authenticated but cannot be encrypted encrypted (the associated data in the
AEAD mode). For instance the routing information in a packet should not be encrypted.
However, it is vital to authenticate this information. On the other hand, the payload should
be both encrypted and authenticated. Therefore the associated data would be the routing
information in this mode. The second property of these schemes is that they should be able
to process the data even without knowing the overall length of it. Another desirable prop-
erty is parallelization, which allows the processing of different message blocks in a parallel
manner.




– Input: The plaintext message M of arbitrary but usually limited length, a secret
key K, a public message number (PMN ) which is a publicly random number
nonce and an optional associated data AD.
– Output: A corresponding ciphertext C of the same length as the plaintext along
with a ﬁxed-length authentication tag T is generated.
• Decryption and Veriﬁcation:
– Input: The ciphertext C, the same secret keyK, the same random nonce PMN
that is used in the encryption process, the associated data AD if used in the
encryption and the authentication tag T .
– Output: Either the corresponding plaintext M or invalid (⊥) if the computed
authentication tag T ′ does not match the received one.
2.3.1 Security Requirements for Authenticated Encryption Schemes
An AEAD scheme should meet the following security requirements:
• Key Recovery: It should be infeasible to ﬁnd the private key by any technique other
than exhaustive search.
• Forgery Attack: It must be computationally infeasible to forge a valid tag for a chosen
message if the private key is unknown. We call the attack an existential forgery attack
if the attacker has chosen the plaintext and we call it a universal forgery attack if the
message is given to the attacker.
14
• State Recovery: It should be computationally infeasible to recover the internal state
of the AEAD primitive without knowledge of its key.
• Indistinguishability: It should be infeasible to distinguish the AEAD or AE primitive
from a random function.
2.4 Differential Cryptanalysis
2.4.1 Introduction
In differential cryptanalysis, the general approach is to analyze the effect of modifying
speciﬁc bits in two plaintext pairs on the differences in the resulting output ciphertext pairs.
This process is performed on a set of plaintext and ciphertext pairs that have the same
difference among each other. This is useful since we can compute the probabilities for each
possible key and consequently ﬁnd the most probable one. In this work, the exclusive-or
operation (XOR) is used to calculate the difference between any two pairs. In the following
sections we explain the basic ideas behind this attack in more details.
2.4.2 Basic Attack
We consider that our encryption system has the input (plaintext), P = [P1, P2, ..., Pn],
and output (ciphertext), C = [C1, C2, ..., Cn]. For two plaintext pairs P ′ and P ′′, and
their corresponding ciphertext pairs C′ and C ′′, the plaintext difference will be ΔP =
[ΔP1,ΔP2, ...,ΔPn] = P ′⊕P ′′. Our goal is to ﬁnd the plaintext and ciphertext differences
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that occur with high probability. This means that we are searching for a particular path
(called a differential path) where a speciﬁc plaintext pair differenceΔP results in a speciﬁc
ΔC with a high probability. The differential probability is determined by the differential
distribution table of the underlying S-boxes as well as the number of active S-boxes. Let ns
denote the number of bits of the S-box input, we will have a 2nS×2nS matrix where the rows
denote all possible input differences, the columns denote all possible output differences of
the S-box and the cells denote the number of times that the corresponding input difference
to an S-box will give the corresponding output difference. This table is called the difference
distribution table and it shows the probability that a speciﬁc input difference to the S-box
will result in a speciﬁc output difference. By propagating the plaintext pair difference
forward in the encryption system and choosing the most probable input-output difference
pairs, we can get a path that holds with a high probability and its differences in each round.
Therefore we now have the input difference to the last round of the encryption system and
also its output difference for the most probable differential path. In order to ﬁnd the key,
the attacker chooses the plaintext pairs such that they have the difference ΔP . Then, for all
possible key values of the last subround, the attacker propagates from ΔC backwards and
checks if the input difference to the last round is equal to the one for the most probable path.
If it is equal then the counter for this key is incremented. Once all possible key values for
the chosen set of plaintext and ciphertext pairs have been tested, the key with the highest
counter value is chosen as the correct key. The impossible differential attack utilizes the
probabilities in a different manner. In the following section, the impossible differential
attack which is used in this work is explained in detail.
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2.4.3 Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis
The impossible differential attack was ﬁrst used in [5] to break the IDEA and Khufu block
ciphers reduced to four and a half rounds and the Skipjack block cipher reduced to thirty-
one out of thirty-two rounds. In this approach, instead of searching for the most probable
paths in the cipher, we look for the paths whose probability of occurrence is exactly zero.
These paths consist of the differences of two pairs of plaintexts, the difference of their in-
ternal values and their corresponding ciphertexts differences. We call a path an impossible
differential path if the probability of its occurrence is zero. Thus while in the differen-
tial cryptanalysis [6] the differential characteristic (path) with the highest probability is
exploited, in the impossible differential cryptanalysis [11] the approach is to look for the
differential with zero probability, i.e., for plaintext/cipher differences that can never occur
together. Since the correct key can never decrypt a ciphertext pair to that input difference,
this information can be used to ﬁnd the key. Therefore ﬁrst an impossible differential path
is found from ΔA to ΔB. A trial key that leads to contradictions is eliminated from the list
of correct keys. By iterating over all possible last round key values and decrypting the ci-
phertext in the impossible differential path using that key, we can get the middle difference.
Now if by encrypting the plaintext pairs driven from the impossible differential path using
a trial key we get a contradicting difference in the middle, then we can omit this trial key
since the probability that the path holds true for a correct key is zero. This way wrong keys
are eliminated and once all possible key values for the chosen paths have been processed,
we are left with a small candidate list of correct keys which has the correct key in it and
sometimes left with a single correct key if adequate chosen pairs are used.
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Chapter 3
Attacks on Lesamnta-512 and DHA-256
In this chapter, an impossible differential attack is applied to the underlying block cipher
of the Lesamnta-512 hash function. We also provide a practical free-start collision for the
DHA-256 compression function reduced to 17 steps using the algebraic approach proposed
in [25].
3.1 Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Lesamnta-512
In this section, an impossible differential attack against the underlying block cipher of
Lesamnta-512 hash function is presented. Two automated methods, namely, the Uniﬁed
method [22] and the Matrix [18] method, were proposed in order to ﬁnd impossible differ-
ential paths. These methods are ﬁrst studied and analyzed for discovering the longest im-
possible differential path for our attack. The two techniques are compared in terms of their
suitability for targeted block cipher structure. The results are then utilized to construct and
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perform an impossible differential attack against Lesamnta-512. In the automated methods,
the goal is to ﬁnd the longest impossible differential path in a Block Cipher. This path is
demonstrated in the form of (α0, ..., αn−1) → (β0, ..., βn−1), i.e., the probability that the
input difference (α0, ..., αn−1) leads to the output difference (β0, ..., βn−1) after r rounds is
exactly zero. In these vectors, n denote the total number of sub-blocks of the considered
block cipher and each element of the vector is its corresponding difference. A sub-block
is deﬁned as the group of bits that undergoes the same operations in the round function.
Both the Matrix method [18] and the Uniﬁed method [22]. These techniques are automated
methods that can be used to ﬁnd the longest impossible differential path for any block
cipher. In the following sections, ﬁrst a background on the impossible differential crypt-
analysis on Lesamnta-512 is given. Afterwards, the Matrix and the Uniﬁed methods are
explained and then compared in terms of their performance and results. Based on the com-
parison results, the Uniﬁed method is determined as the suitable method for ﬁnding paths
for the Lesamnta-512 block cipher. This method is modiﬁed and applied to Lesamnta-512
in order to perform an impossible differential cryptanalysis on it. Afterwards, the analysis
of the impossible differential attack is given and ﬁnally this chapter is concluded.
3.1.1 Lesamnta-512 Preliminaries
In this work, we use the impossible differential attack to recover the key of the underly-
ing block cipher of Lesamnta-512 hash function after the change in its round constants
introduced to avoid the previous attacks performed on it [15].
The following notations will be used throughout this chapter: We denote the input
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difference by α and the output difference after r-rounds is written as αr. The ith sub-
block of α (respectively αr) is denoted by αi (respectively αir ). The input difference
vector corresponding to α (respectively αr) is denoted by α = (α0, ..., αn−1) (respectively
αr = (αr0, ..., α
r
n−1)). The ith entry of α (respectively αr) is denoted by αi (respectively
αi
r). In the decryption analysis we use the notations β, βi, βr, β = (β0, ..., βn−1), βi, βr
and βir instead of α, αi, αr, α , αi, αr and αir in the same order. Note that α = α0, α =
α0, β = β0 and β = β0. Finding the longest impossible differential is the major step in
attacking ciphers using impossible differential cryptanalysis.
Specﬁcations of the Lesamnta-512 Block Cipher
The Lesamnta hash function family is categorized into three types based on their block sizes
and data words used in their initial and the internal values [14]. These new family of hash
functions have a narrow-pipe Merkle-Damgård structure and their algorithms are named
Lesamnta-224 (256 bit block size), Lesamnta-256 (256 bit block size), Lesamnta-384 (512
bit block size and message digest size of 384 bits), and Lesamnta-512. Our focus in this
work is Lesamnta-512 which has a block size of 512 bits long, a word size of 64 bits long
and a message digest size of 512 bits long. Also, in this work the analysis is performed
on the new version of Lesamnta-512 after introducing the change in its round constants.
One of the main design criteria used in Lesamnta-512 has been its provable security using
the Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (MMO) mode assuming that the underlying block cipher acts as
an ideal primitive. Find a differential characteristic or impossible differential characteristic
for the underlying cipher would imply that it is not ideal and renders the security proof for




Figure 1: The internal block cipher structure of the Lesamnta-512 compression function
block cipher which is a generalized Feistel structure with 4 branches and has 32 rounds.
Each branch is 128 bits long and the user key is 512 bits. The internal block cipher is
utilized in the Matyas-Meyer-Oseas mode. Fig. 1 shows one round of the internal block ci-
pher of Lesamnta-512. In the following section, the key scheduling algorithm is explained.
The Key Scheduling Algorithm of the Lesamnta-512 Block Cipher
The key scheduling algorithm for Lesamnta-512 block cipher is shown in Algorithm 1. In
this algorithm, the input is the variable "chain" which is the 8 word input (each 64 bits).
Nrcomp512 is the number of rounds of the block cipher which, for Lesamnta-512, is equal
to 32 rounds. The variable K is a Nrcomp512 × 2 matrix with its rows being the round
number and the columns being the ﬁrst and second half of the round sub-key, i.e., the 128
bit subkey for round r will be the concatenation of K[r][0] and K[r][1]. In each round,
a round constant C[round] (128-bit words) which is two 64 bits is added to chain[4] and
chain[5]. C[round] is given by:
C[round] = 00000000000000XY 00000000000000ZW (2)
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where XY is 2r + 1 (in hex), and ZW is 2r for round r (in hex). The SubWords512, Key-
Linear512, ByteTranspose512 and WordRotation512 functions used in the key scheduling
algorithm are described below.
The SubWords512() function performs substitution in which it takes the input (128 bit in
Lesamnta-512) and passes it from the Lesamnta-512 S-box and outputs the result. The
KeyLinear512, ByteTranspose512 and WordRotation512 functions perform a permutation
on their inputs. The input to KeyLinear512 and ByteTranspose512 are 16 bytes and for
WordRotation512, the input is 8 words (each 64 bits). The speciﬁcation of the permutation
for KeyLinear512 function is shown in Eq. 4 and for ByteTranspose512, it is given by Eq.
3. Finally, WordRotation512 performs the permutation x′i mod 8 = xi on the input xi
where 0 ≤ i ≤ 7.
Algorithm 1 The Key Scheduling Algorithm of Lesamnta-512
1: procedure KS(WORD chain[8], WORD K[Nrcomp512][2])
2: word t[2];
3: for (round = 0 to Nrcomp512 − 1){
4: t[0] = chain[4] + C[round][0];






11: chain[6] = chain[6] + t[0];




16: K[round][0] = chain[2];
17: K[round][1] = chain[3];
18: }
22
a′0 = a8, a
′
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′
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′
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′




The KeyLinear512 permutation function equation is shown below. In this equation the
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3.1.2 Methods for Finding Impossible Differential Paths with Maxi-
mum Length
3.1.2.1 The Matrix Method
In this section we describe the Matrix method introduced in [18]. This method is used to
ﬁnd the best impossible differential path in the terms of the path length for block ciphers
based on the condition that the round function of the block cipher is a bijective function.
The Encryption and Decryption Characteristic Matrices
In this technique, two matrices are used in order to represent the encryption and decryption
operations of a single round of the block cipher. One matrix is the encryption character-
istic matrix, denoted as E, and the other is the decryption characteristic matrix, denoted
as D. The dimension of these matrices is n × n. The rows of these matrices denote the
input differences corresponding to each sub-block which are a total of n sub-blocks and the
columns denote the output differences corresponding to each sub-block (a total of n), for
one single round of the block cipher.
Constructing the E Characteristics Matrix
The following principles are used in constructing the encryption characteristic matrix. The
round function is denoted as F and its inverse is denoted as F−1. The encryption charac-
teristic matrix is constructed based on the following steps [18]:
1. If βj is affected by αi, i.e., βj = αi ⊕ b where ⊕ is a modular addition and b is a
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constant value, the entry E(i, j) is set to 1.
2. If βj is affected by F (αi) or F−1(αi), the entry E(i, j) is set to 1F .
3. If βj is not affected by αj , the entry E(i, j) is set to 0.
Constructing the D Characteristics Matrix
The following principles are used in constructing the decryption characteristic matrix [18]:
1. If αj is affected by βi, the entry D(i, j) is set to 1.
2. If αj is affected by F (βi) or F−1(βi), the entry D(i, j) is set to 1F .
3. If αj is not affected by βj , the entry D(i, j) is set to 0.















Deﬁnition 1 Property one matrix: TheE andD matrices are called property-one matrices
if and only if the total number of 1 entries in each column is at most one. This automated
technique requires both E and D to be property-one matrices.
The Matrix Technique Process





Figure 2: One round of the Feistel Structure
cipher after various rounds. We perform this analysis using the E and D characteristic
matrices. However, ﬁrst we categorize the values that the entries of both the input and
output difference vectors can take. In this technique, the elements of the input and output
difference vectors are not set to a speciﬁc input differences, i.e., all the differences that are
useful in determining the best impossible differential path are considered. Therefore, for a
given input difference, the possible output difference of each sub-block can belong to one
of the following categories:
1. A zero difference (denoted as 0).
2. A non-zero non-ﬁxed difference (denoted as 1 and δ).
3. A non-zero ﬁxed difference (denoted as 1∗ and γ).
4. Exclusive-or (XOR) of a non-zero ﬁxed difference and a non-zero non-ﬁxed dif-
ference (denoted as 2∗ and γ ⊕ δ).
5. A non-ﬁxed difference (denoted as t where t ≥ 2).
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In all the categories of differences above, a ﬁxed difference is a difference that has not
been affected by any round function F and a non-ﬁxed difference represents a difference
that has been affected by at least one round function F .
Now let us consider all possible values for the entries of the difference vectors α and
β. The difference values of the initial input vector α0 can only have ﬁxed values since its
sub-blocks are not affected by any round function F or F−1. Therefore, we can conclude
that the possible values of its elements can only be 0 or 1∗. For the encryption process, we
need to know the output difference values of the difference vector α after r rounds, that is
αr. Equivalently, it would mean that αr is the propagation of α after the effect of the E
matrix in r rounds. Similarly by using β, βr and the matrix D instead of α , αr and the
matrix E, we can calculate βr in the decryption process. Therefore, the values of the vector
αr in terms of the vector α can be computed as follows:
αr = ((((α · E) · E) · · · ) · E) = ((((α1 · E) · E) · · · ) · E) = · · · = αr−1 · E) (6)
In order to calculate αr using Eq. 6, we need to deﬁne the multiplication of α and the char-
acteristic matrix E. Eq. 7 deﬁnes this multiplication where r ≥ 0. Also the multiplication
ai.Ei,j is deﬁned in Table 1 and the addition of ai.Ei,j and ai′ .Ei′,j is deﬁned in Table 2.
α · E = (αi)1×n · (Ei,j)n×n = (σiαi · Ei,j)1×n (7)
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αi.Ei Meaning
k.0 = 0 The output difference of the jth sub-block not affected by the input difference αi.
k.1 = k The output difference of the jth sub-block affected by the input difference αi.
0.1F = 0 For a zero difference, the output difference after F is also zero.
1∗.1F = 1 For a difference γ the output difference after F is δ.
1.1F = 1 For a difference δ,the output difference after F is δ′.
2∗.1F = 2 For a difference γ ⊕ δ, the output difference after F is t.
t.1F = t For a difference t, the output difference after F is also t.
Table 1: Multiplication between the difference vector entry αi and the matrix entry Ei
(where k ∈ {0, 1, 1∗, 2∗, t} and t ≥ 2) [18].
Addition Exclusive-or
k.0 = 0 The output of the jth sub-block is not affected by the input αi.
0 + k = k 0 ⊕ Δ = Δ
1 + 1 = 2 δ ⊕ δ′ = ?
1 + 1∗ = 2∗ δ ⊕ γ = δ ⊕ γ
1 + 2∗ = 3 δ ⊕ (δ′ ⊕ γ) = ?
1 + t = 1 + t δ ⊕ ? = ?
1∗ + t = 1 + t γ ⊕ ? = ?
2∗ + t = 2 + t (γ ⊕ δ) ⊕ ? = ?
t+ t′ = t+ t′ ? ⊕ ? = ?
Table 2: Relation of addition and XOR where k ∈ {0, 1, 1∗, 2∗, t} and t ≥ 2, t′ ≥ 2 and Δ
is the corresponding difference for k. The ? mark denotes the differences which we do not
know their value [18].
βj can be calculated in the same manner as αi using the vector β and the characteristic
matrix D.
The difference t ≥ 2 is not useful in ﬁnding the differential path since these differences
are non-ﬁxed differences and so they can be 0 or any other non-zero value. Therefore, these
differences in the difference vector do not provide us with any additional information on
its value and are rendered useless. The useful values for the differences will be put in the
set u. In this case, u = {0, 1, 1∗, 2∗} since we excluded the value t. For each m ∈ u, an
auxiliary set m¯ is deﬁned and used in ﬁnding the best impossible differential path in terms
of the path length. This set is shown in Table 3. Let αri ∈ 2∗ and βr′i ∈ 2¯∗. Using the sets u
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m Differences m¯ Differences
0 0 0¯ = {1, 1∗} δ or γ.
1 δ 1¯ = {0} 0.
1∗ γ 1¯∗ = {0, 1∗, 2∗} 0 γ′ = γ or γ ⊕ δ.
2∗ γ ⊕ δ 2¯∗ = {1∗} γ.
Table 3: Differences corresponding to the entries m ∈ u and their corresponding entry sets
m¯ [18].
and m¯, there will be an r + r′ round impossible differential path from α to β. We further
explain the process of ﬁnding an impossible differential path with the maximum length in
the following section.
Calculating the Longest Impossible Differential Path
Let M denote the length of the longest impossible differential path for the target block
cipher.
Deﬁnition 2 Given an input difference vector α, an entry m ∈ u and the set m¯, we deﬁne
and calculate the following variables in the encryption process.
MEi(α,m) ≡ maxr{r|αir = m},
MEi(α, m¯) ≡ maxl∈m¯{MEi(α, l)},
MEi(m) ≡ maxα¯=0{MEi(α,m)},
MEi(m¯) ≡ maxα¯=0{MEi(α, m¯)}.
(8)
The same deﬁnition applies to the decryption process but the vector β and the characteristic
matrix D will be used instead of the vector α and the characteristic matrix E, respectively.
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M(α, β) are deﬁned as follows:
M(α, β) ≡ maxi,m{MEi(α,m) +MDi(β, m¯)} = maxi,m{MEi(α, m¯) +MDi(β,m)}
(9)
When the round function of a cipher is bijective and the encryption and decryption charac-
teristic matrices E and D are both one-property matrices, M can be calculated as follows:
M = max
α=0,β =0
M(α, β) = max
i,m




The algorithm used to calculate M using Eq. 10 is explained in the following section.
Algorithm to Compute M
This algorithm is proposed to calculate the length M assuming that the block cipher round
function is a bijective function and the encryption and decryption characteristic matrices
are one-property matrices. The algorithm consists of the following ﬁve steps:
1. Form the encryption characteristic matrix E.
2. Compute the values of MEi(m).
3. Form the decryption characteristic matrix D.
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4. Compute the values of MDi(m¯).
5. Output the length M by applying MEi(m) and MDi(m¯) into Eq. 10.
In the ﬁrst step, two variables ei,j and e˜i,j are used to represent the entries ofEi,j . The value
of ei,j is set to zero if Ei,j = 0 and set ei,j is set to 1 if Ei,j = 1 or if Ei,j = 1F . Additionally,
we set e˜i,j = 0 if Ei,j = 1 and set e˜i,j = 1 if Ei,j = 0 or if Ei,j = 1F .
In the second step, in order to represent the ith entry of the difference vector αr, a new
variable ar,i is deﬁned and is assigned the integer value of the ith entry of αr without the ∗
symbol.
Similarly, the variable aˆr,i is introduced and is set to 0 if the entry does not have the ∗
symbol. Otherwise it is set to −1.
Complexity of the algorithm
In this algorithm, steps 2 and 4 dominate the running time in which the algorithm iterates
over all possible input differences of the vectors α and β. Note that in these steps the num-
ber of the sub-blocks and the possible values for each sub-block determine the number of
the iteration itself. Therefore we have 2n iterations to compute MEi(m) and similarly 2n
iterations to compute MDi(m). Thus, the time complexity of the algorithm is bounded by
O(2n).
Another method used to ﬁnd the longest impossible differential path is the Uniﬁed method
introduced [22]. This method provides us with longer paths than the ones derived with
the Matrix method. However, some restrictions do apply as the complexity of the Uniﬁed
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method will be high for block ciphers with more sub-blocks as compared to the Matrix
method. Further comparison is performed in the following sections. Considering that
Lesamnta-512 has four sub-blocks and based on the comparison results explained further,
it is concluded that the Uniﬁed method can be a good candidate method for ﬁnding the
longest impossible differential path for Lesamnta-512. In the section below the Uniﬁed
method is explained.
3.1.2.2 The Uniﬁed Method
The Uniﬁed impossible differential path ﬁnding method [22] (UID-method) also tries to
ﬁnd the longest impossible differential path for block cipher structures in an automatic
manner. Luo et al. [22] explain how this technique ﬁnds paths longer than the ones found
by the previous technique.
It is assumed that the round function of the block cipher is a bijective function. The
possible values for the difference vector are categorized in a different approach than that
of the Matrix method. The possible values for the input and output difference vector are
categorized as follows in the Uniﬁed method:
1. A zero difference (denoted by 0).
2. A non-zero ﬁxed difference (denoted as li).
3. A non-zero varied difference (can be any value except zero and is denoted as mi).
4. A varied difference (can be any value and is denoted as ri).
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Deﬁnition 3 Two differences vectors α = (α0, α1, · · · , αn−1) and β = (β0, β1, · · · , βn−1)
are inconsistent if there exists a subset I ∈ {0, 1, ..., n − 1} such that the XOR of the
differences in the subset are always unequal, i.e., ⊕i∈Iαi = ⊕i∈Iβi.
For example, if α = (l1⊕m1, 0) and β = (l1, 0) where l1 is a non-zero ﬁxed difference
and m1 is a non-zero varied difference, then α and β are inconsistent since l1 ⊕m1 cannot
be equal to l1 in any condition. After i rounds in the encryption process we can compute
αi and after j rounds in the decryption process we can compute βj . If αi and βj are
inconsistent then we can conclude that an impossible differential path of length i+ j exists.
In this technique we deﬁne three types of transformations:
1. Zero transformation denoted as 0: If the input difference is x ∈ {0, li,mi, ri} and
the output difference is 0.
2. Identical transformation denoted as 1: If the input difference is x ∈ {0, li,mi, ri}
and the output difference is x.
3. Non-linear bijective transformation denoted as F .
Transformation F can occur in the different scenarios illustrated below:
- If the input difference is 0 and also the output difference is 0.
- If the input difference is a non-zero ﬁxed difference li and also the output difference
is a new non-zero varied difference mj .
- If the input difference is a non-zero varied difference mi and also the output differ-
ence is a new non-zero varied difference mj .
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- Otherwise, the output difference will be a new varied difference rj , i.e., it can be any
value.
The construction of the encryption characteristic matrixE and decryption characteristic
matrix D is same as the Matrix method. However, the Uniﬁed method can be used even for
the block ciphers that their E and D characteristic matrices do not satisfy the one-property.
In this technique, a new concept about E and D is introduced. This concept can be well
illustrated with an example. Suppose (β1, β2) = (F (α1 ⊕ α2), F (α1 ⊕ α2) ⊕ α2). Then
the encryption function can be divided into two functions. The ﬁrst function is (z1, z2) =
(α1⊕α2, α2) and the second function is (β1, β2) = (F (z1), F (z1)⊕ z2). Consequently, the














where E1 and E2 are the encryption characteristic matrices for the ﬁrst and second func-
tion, respectively.
Searching for the Longest Impossible Differential Path in the Uniﬁed Method
In this section, the algorithm and the steps used to calculate the longest impossible dif-
ferential path using the Uniﬁed method are explained. This algorithm iterates over all the
possible combinations of the input and output difference vectors and then iterates over all
the possible combinations of the number of rounds to ﬁnd the longest path using Deﬁnition
3.
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The input to this algorithm is the n× n encryption characteristic matrix E, the decryption
characteristic matrix D and an integer which is the round number which starts with r = 0.
The output to this algorithm is the computation result of the longest impossible differential
path Δin → Δout. The algorithm performs the following steps in order to ﬁnd the longest
impossible differential path:
step 1. For a difference vector pair (α, β), ﬁnd the maximum integer m = i + j
such that αi = ((((α.E).E)...).E) (this multiplication is performed i times) and
βj = ((((β.D).D)...).D) (this multiplication is performed j times) are inconsistent.
If r ≤ m, let r ← m and (Δin,Δout) ← (α, β).
step 2. Repeat step 1 until all the possible input and output difference vectors (α, β)
are enumerated.
step 3. Return Δin → Δout.
Complexity of the Algorithm
Step 1 dominates the running time of the algorithm, in which it iterates over all the pos-
sible input and output differences of the difference vectors α and β. The number of the
sub-blocks and the possible values for each sub-block determine the total number of these
iterations. Assume we have n sub-blocks and each sub-block can take values 0 or li where
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} then we can conclude that the time bound of the algorithm will be
O(((n+ 1)n − 1)2) = O(n2n).
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Analysis and Comparison of the Two Methods
The algorithms mentioned in section 3.1.2 are used to evaluate the immunity of block ci-
phers against impossible differential cryptanalysis by trying to ﬁnd the longest impossible
differential trail. In this section we compare between these two methods.
Both methods eliminate the difﬁculties and errors resulting from manual analysis by
using a completely automated technique. Since in the Matrix method the encryption and
decryption characteristic matrices must have one-property, this method cannot be applied
to block ciphers that do not satisfy this property. However, this condition does not need to
be satisﬁed in the Uniﬁed method for ﬁnding the longest impossible differential trail, i.e.,
the Uniﬁed technique can ﬁnd the longest impossible differential path even if the D and E
characteristic matrices do not satisfy the one-property.
The Uniﬁed method can ﬁnd trails longer than the Matrix method for the same block
cipher given as their inputs. This occurs for two reasons. First, the Matrix method cannot
determine some kinds of inconsistency. As a result, some longer impossible differentials
cannot be found (the tool using the Uniﬁed method mentioned in Section 3.1.2 has found
trails longer than the ones found by the tool using the Matrix method). Deﬁnition 3 on
inconsistency used in the UID method is more categorized than the one used in the tool
using the Matrix method meaning that in the Uniﬁed method, the non-zero differences
assigned to each sub-block are categorized in more categories. As a result, for the same
block cipher, it ﬁnds impossible differential trails longer than the one found by the other
tool. Secondly, in the Matrix method, the differences used at the beginning are either zero
(0) or nonzero ﬁxed differences (1∗). Therefore, in this method, it is considered that all the
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non-zero differences are equal. Consequently, some longer paths may not be found.
Another consideration is that in both the Matrix method and the Uniﬁed method we do
not take the detailed structure of the block ciphers round function into account. Conse-
quently, this will lead to losing some trails that may be longer than the ones found by these
tools. Additionally, the sub-block length is another factor that the Matrix method does not
use, i.e., the number of the bits in each sub-block does not alter the results for the same
block cipher. This may lead to losing some information about the differences that can be
helpful in ﬁnding a longer impossible differential path. The same consideration is valid
for the Uniﬁed method except for the fact that the differentiation in the non-zero difference
assignment to each sub-block helps in utilizing some information for the sub-block length.
As mentioned in section 3.1.2, the time complexity of the impossible differential path
algorithm for the Matrix method is O(2n). Therefore, for any block cipher of n sub-blocks
where n ≤ 32 we will be able to ﬁnd the best impossible differential trail using this tech-
nique. On the other hand, the time complexity for the longest impossible differential path
algorithm in the Uniﬁed method is O(n2n). This time complexity makes this technique
not suitable for block ciphers having more than 8 sub-blocks such as advanced encryption
standard (AES) cipher which has 16 sub-blocks.
All these limitations mentioned for the Matrix method restricts this method to be a
generic technique but results in a lower time complexity than the Uniﬁed method. Addi-
tionally any tool using the Uniﬁed method is not generic in the sense of the time complexity.
This time complexity will make this method impractical for many ciphers that have sub-
blocks greater than 8. However, in our case, the number of sub-blocks is relatively small.
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Therefore the Uniﬁed method will be the suitable automated tool since it provides us with
a longer impossible differential path than those found by the the Matrix method and is also
practical in terms of its time complexity [22]. Therefore for Lesamnta-512 with less than
16 sub-blocks we use the Uniﬁed method to reach longer paths than the Matrix method.
3.1.3 Application of the Uniﬁed Method to Lesamnta-512
The Lesamnta hash function, introduced by Hirose et al. in 2009 [14] was submitted to the
NIST cryptographic competition for hash algorithms. The internal block-cipher utilized in
the Lesamnta-512 compression function is a generalized Feistel structure with 4 branches
and has 32 rounds. Each branch is 128 bits and the user key is 512 bits. The detailed
description is provided in section 3.1.1 and the structure is shown in Fig. 1. Bouillaguet
et al. proposed a full round distinguisher for the underlying block cipher in [8]. As a re-
sult, in [16] the authors have performed a security analysis of the compression function of
Lesamnta and the impact of it on full Lesamnta and proposed a change in the round con-
stants to avoid the attack proposed by Bouillaguet et al.. It is concluded that a change in
the round constants is required in order for Lesamnta to be secure against ﬁrst and second
pre-image resistance and collision resistance attacks. Lesamnta is of interest since it has
efﬁcient implementations and one of the main focuses in its design has been provable secu-
rity by using Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (MMO) mode with the assumption that the underlying
block cipher is acting as an ideal primitive. In this work, we use the impossible differential
attack to recover the Lesamnta block cipher key. We have exploited the impossible differ-
ential behavior of Lesamnta-512 block cipher reduced to 16 rounds in order to derive its
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key.
Using the Uniﬁed method, a 15 round impossible differential path is found and then is used
as a distinguisher from a random permutation. The encryption characteristic matrix E and
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The 15 round impossible differential path found using the Uniﬁed method is from (0, 0, 0, l1)
to (0, 0, l1, 0). The forward path driven from this input difference vector is shown in Table 4
and the backward path is shown in Table 5 driven from the output difference vector. These
two paths have inconsistency in the round they meet. In these impossible paths li denotes a
non-zero ﬁxed difference where li = li′ and mi is a non-zero non-ﬁxed difference, i.e., it is
an output of a bijective function or key addition where mi = mi′, and ﬁnally ri is a zero or
any difference where ri = ri′. In all these notations, i is just a unique index for the different
variables. In the following section, the Lesamnta family block ciphers speciﬁcation is ex-
plained before illustrating the impossible differential attack on Lesamnta-512 block cipher.
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Round number First branch Second branch Third branch Fourth branch
1 0 0 0 l1
2 l1 0 0 0
3 0 l1 0 0
4 0 0 l1 0
5 m39 0 0 l1
6 l1 m39 0 0
7 0 l1 m39 0
Table 4: The impossible differential path found in the forward direction using the Uniﬁed
method. Each branch in each round has either zero, non-zero ﬁxed (li), non-zero non-ﬁxed
(mi) or other varied (ri) difference.
Round number First branch Second branch Third branch Fourth branch
7 m56 l1 +m58 m52 + r97 m54 + r98
8 m54 m56 l1 +m58 m52 + r97
9 m52 m54 m56 l1 +m58
10 l1 m52 m54 m56
11 0 l1 m52 m54
12 0 0 l1 m52
13 0 0 0 l1
14 l1 0 0 0
15 0 l1 0 0
16 0 0 l1 0
Table 5: The impossible differential path found in the backward direction. Each branch in
each round has either zero, non-zero ﬁxed (li), non-zero non-ﬁxed (mi) or other varied (ri)
difference.
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3.1.4 The Impossible Differential Attack
The ﬁrst goal in using the impossible differential path derived from the Uniﬁed method is
to calculate the number of structures needed in order to make sure all wrong keys are elim-
inated and therefore we are left with only one correct sub-key. Starting with 2s structures ,
we set the expected value for the wrong keys left to be approximately 2−14. First we ﬁnd all
the possible plaintexts that will have the input and output impossible differential differences
(0, 0, 0, a) and (0, 0, a, 0), respectively. The output difference at round seventeen can only
be resulted from a difference at step 18 where only the ﬁrst and last two words have differ-
ences. Therefore, we have 23×128 possible values for the ﬁrst three words of the impossible
differentials and 2128 values for each pair in the last word. We conclude that all possible
plaintexts with this input difference (output difference in step 17) are 25×128 and the portion
of these pairs that also hold in the output difference are 25×128 × 2−2×128 = 23×128. So all
these 23×128 pairs will deﬁnitely remove all the wrong keys since these are all the possible
pairs that hold in the impossible differential path and we know that the probability of this
paths occurrence is exactly zero. Considering our input difference, we have 2255 pairs for
each structure since the input difference is of the form (0, 0, 0, a) and for each 2128 values
in each pair we choose two of them each time and the total number of pairs per structure









As we concluded all 23×128 pairs will deﬁnitely remove all the keys. Therefore, by each
structure we can be assured that one wrong key will be removed (based on the number
of pairs per structure). Let P (T ) denote the probability that a structure would remove a
speciﬁc key. Therefore, it is inferred that P (T ) = 1
2128
= 2−128. Now let P (F ) denote
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the probability that a structure does not remove a wrong key. Then we can deduce that
P (F ) = 1− P (T ) = 1− 2−128.
Therefore, each plaintext pair that holds the output difference will not remove the wrong
key with a probability of P (F ) = 1 − 2−128. We have 2s such structures and for each we
have Np = 2255 plaintext pairs and 2−256 portion of these plaintext pairs will hold true in
the output difference. Therefore we have a total of Nt = 2s × 2255 × 2−256 = 2s−1 of such
plaintext pairs. Let P (St) denote the probability that none of the structures remove a wrong
key. Based on P (F ) and Nt we conclude that the probability that none of the structures re-
move a wrong key will be P (St) = P (F )Nt = (1− 2−128)2s×2255×2−256 = (1− 2−128)2s−1
since for each possible plaintext pair ﬁltered according to the output difference, there is a
probability of P (F ) that none of their structures remove a wrong key from the list of all
possible key values.
LetNw denote the number of wrong keys left in the list of all possible values of the sub-
key. We have 2128 values for the last round sub-key and therefore based on the probability
P (St) we can calculate the expectation of the number of wrong keys left (Exp{Nw}) as
2128 × (1− 2−128)2s−1 since we have 2128 possible values for each sub-key to guess and
for each of these keys we have a probability P (St) = (1− 2−128)2s−1 that none of the
structures will remove this key.
As stated in the attack, we need the expectation of the number of wrong keys left to
be equal to 2−14 in order to assure that an adequate number of structures and accordingly
plaintexts have been passed and tried. By solving this equation we ﬁnd the number of
structures to be 2134. Now that we know the adequate number of structures in order to be
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able to ﬁnd the correct key, we can apply the impossible differential cryptanalysis.
We Start with 2134 structures each consisting of Np = 2255 plaintext pairs per structure.
We pass a total of 2255×2134 plaintext pairs and ﬁlter out the pairs that hold true in the output
difference of (b, 0, 0, a) in round eighteen since the output difference at round seventeen
being (0, 0, a, 0) can only be resulted from a difference at step eighteen where only the
ﬁrst and last two words have differences. We can do this step by using the corresponding
ciphertexts and looking up at their differences. Next, for each possible value of the last
round sub-key and for each of these plaintext pairs, we collect the corresponding ciphertext
using the guessed key and compute the difference of round seventeen by decrypting the
values in round eighteen. If the values match the impossible difference, then we are assured
that the guessed key is the wrong key and should be eliminated from the list. Otherwise, we
move to the next guessed key value and repeat these steps. Therefore, the data complexity
of our attack is about 2134 × 2255 = 2389. In order to ﬁnd the key, we must have all the 8
words (64 bits each) denoted as chain[i]r in a speciﬁc round r for 1 ≤ i ≤ 8. However,
using the algorithm for ﬁnding the corresponding sub-key, the second and the third words
(chain[2] and chain[3]) are known in each rounds sub-key. If we use the algorithm for
rounds 13 to 17, chain[2]r and chain[3]r are found for 13 ≤ r ≤ 17. The objective is
to ﬁnd the 512 bit key given the sub-keys for rounds 13 to 17. We note that due to the
word rotation step in the key scheduling algorithm, chain[2]13 ‖ chain[3]13 are equal to
chain[4]14 ‖ chain[5]14. Therefore, in round 14 we have chain[i]14 for 2 ≤ i ≤ 5. Let
us denote chain[6]14 ‖ chain[7]14 as the unknown variable X . As a result, in round 15,
chain[6]15 and chain[7]15 are evaluated as a function of X . In this round chain[i]15 is
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known for 2 ≤ i ≤ 7 up to an unknown parameter X . Also in the next round, again
because of the word rotation, all the known values are shifted to the right and by adding
the new sub-key values found by the algorithm, chain[i]16 are known for 0 ≤ i ≤ 7
except for X . The only remaining unknown parameter to ﬁnd is the parameter X . Note
that in round 17, chain[6]15 and chain[7]15 are now shifted to chain[2]17 and chain[3]17.
As a result, X can be found. According to the key schedule algorithm ﬁve sub-keys are
required in order to obtain the 512 bit user key and therefore the data complexity would
be 5 × 2389, the memory complexity would be 5 × 2128 and the time complexity would be
2261 × 5 encryptions based on the pairs that have the desired difference in steps 17 to 18
(2389× 2−256). For each of these pairs the encryptions are performed for all possible values
of subkeys, i.e. 2128. Therefore the total number of encryptions for ﬁnding a subkey would
be 2389×2−256×2128 = 2261. These encryptions should be performed for 5 subkeys to ﬁnd
the user key(therefore, 5 rounds).
The pseudo code for ﬁnding all words in step 16 is given in Algorithm 2:
3.2 Collision on Step-reduced DHA-256 Hash Function
In 2012, Keccak was announced as the winner of the NIST hash function competition.
However, it has been noted that SHA-2 can be a better alternative than Keccak in terms
of widely use of general CPUs based on eBASH project (ECRYPT Benchmarking of All
Submitted Hashes). Therefore new hash functions following the SHA-2 design strategy are
still attractive for software applications. Double Hash Algorithm (DHA)-256 hash function
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Algorithm 2 Finding key given sub-keys of rounds 13 ≤ i ≤ 17
1: procedure FINDING THE X VARIABLE
2: t ← chain[2]13 ‖ chain[3]13
3: t ← SubWords512(t)
4: t ← KeyLinear512(t)
5: t ← ByteTranspos512(t)
6: X ← (chain[2]17 ‖ chain[3]17)− t
7: procedure FINDING THE KEY
8: chain[0]16 ‖ chain[1]16 ← Bit Operation (chain[2]13 and chain[3]13)+X
9: chain[4]16 ‖ chain[5]16 ← chain[2]15 ‖ chain[3]15
10: chain[6]16 ‖ chain[7]16 ← Bit Operation (chain[2]14 ‖ chain[3]14) +
chain[0]16 ‖ chain[1]16
11: procedure BIT OPERATION(INPUT : chain[2]13 ‖ chain[3]13, OUTPUT : t)
12: t ← chain[2]13 ‖ chain[3]13
13: t ← SubWords512(t)
14: t ← KeyLinear512(t)
15: t ← ByteTranspos512(t)
is one of the early designs introduced to strengthen the SHA-2 hash function. There are two
main differences introduced compared to SHA-2. First, the message expansion formula is
different and it has been changed in a way to use the nearest previous messages in its
iterations rather than the far steps. This allows the message expansion to use more messages
from previous steps and therefore makes the search for collisions harder. Initially, IAIK
Krypto Group analyzed DHA-256 hash function and found a differential pattern which
holds with a probability 2−63, which is higher than assumed by the designers. Previous
attacks on DHA-256 are pseudo-preimage and preimage on 35 step reduced DHA-256 [31].
However, the complexity is 2240. In [20] a 9-step collision on DHA-256 is introduced with
the complexity of 2−36.
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3.2.1 DHA-256 Preliminaries
In this work, using an algebraic method [25], a 17 step free-start collision is found on DHA-
256 compression function. In particular, ﬁrst an initial differential is derived in accordance
with the message expansion and then a system of equations is determined based on the
initial difference. By limiting the different conditions on the system of equations based
on the initial differential table, the answers to the system are inferred and therefore the
register values (chaining variables) are derived and a free-start collision is found. Hence,
the problem of ﬁnding collisions is reduced to solving the system of equations and checking
if there exists any answers for the message and register values that ﬁt the conditions of our
initial differential pattern instead of searching for all their possible values randomly.
3.2.2 Description of DHA-256
The DHA-256 hash function has message length of 512 bits and output length of 256 bits.
There are 64 steps of operation. Messages are expanded for all the steps based on the
message expansion algorithm in Eq. 13 and 14. For 0 ≤ i ≤ 15, we have:
Wi = mi (13)
for i > 15 we have:
Wi = σ1(Wi−1) +Wi−9 + σ2(Wi−15) +Wi−16 (14)
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As seen in Fig. 3, in every internal state of DHA-256 compression function, we have 32-bit
registers A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H which are called the chaining values. At the ﬁrst step,









Hi+1 = Ai + SS1(Di) + f(Bi, Ci, Di) +Wi +Ki.
(15)






3.2.3 The General Idea of Creating the Collisions
In this section, the technique to ﬁnd the collisions is explained. First a differential path
is derived. However, the message differences are not ﬁxed and we assume that they take



















































Figure 3: DHA-256 hash function structure
for all the step conditions. There are two prominent factors to consider for deriving this
differential path. First, the message differences, δi’s are introduced in order to cancel out
some propagated differences. Hence, we need to assure there exists a value δi in step i such
that the conditions for step i holds. Second, we need to consider the message expansion of
the DHA hash function to assure the message differences introduced will not be used twice
or more in our collision. Otherwise, this difference will be propagated again to further
steps and the collision cannot occur. Assuming a difference is produced at step i of the
hash function, we are going to create a differential path such that after some rounds of
propagation, the register and the message differentials become zero. The path derived as
shown in Table 6. As shown in the table, after the fourth step, all the differences in the
registers and the message difference have been zero. Now our goal is to ﬁnd values for δ1
and δ2 such that this differential path holds.
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Step ΔA ΔB ΔC ΔD ΔE ΔF ΔG ΔH ΔW
i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
i+1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 δ1
i+2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
i+3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
i+4 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 δ2
i+5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 6: The differential path derived for DHA-256.
3.2.4 Deriving the Equations for the Collision Conditions
In this section, difference equations are derived for each step and then the conditions are
achieved based on them.
Equations and Conditions for Step i+ 1
In this step of the hash function, considering Table 6, we have ΔAi = 0, ΔEi = 0 and
ΔWi = 1. We also know that we require ΔDi+1 and ΔHi+1 to be one since we want the
message difference introduced in step i to propagate. Based on Eq. 15, we have:
Wi = Di+1 − Ei − SS2(Hi)− g(Fi, Gi, Hi)−Wi −Ki (17)
Therefore, for the differences we have:
1 = 1−ΔSS2(Hi)−Δg(Fi, Gi, Hi) (18)
Similarly based on Eq. 15 we have:
Wi = Hi+1 − Ai − SS1(Di)− f(Bi, Ci, Di)−Ki (19)
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and we deduct:
1 = 1−ΔSS1(Di)−Δf(Bi, Ci, Di) (20)
Since Δf(0, 0, 0) and Δg(0, 0, 0) are zeroes, then as we assume that ΔWi will be one.
Equations and Conditions for Step i+ 2
We want ΔHi+2 and ΔDi+2 to be zero. Therefore, based on Eq. 17 and 19 we have:
ΔWi+1 = −ΔSS1(Di+1)−Δf i+1(0, 0, 1) (21)
ΔWi+1 = −ΔSS2(Hi+1)−Δgi+1(0, 0, 1) (22)
In this equation, ﬁrst notice that both ΔHi+1 and ΔDi+1 are set to 1 and they are being
rotated to different bit locations by functions SS1(x) and SS2(x). Therefore, we need to
ﬁnd values of Hi+1 and H ′i+1 such that when their values are shifted, they remain the same.
This way we are sure that their propagation in the bits would affect the solution of our
system of equations. The only two values that have this property are:
Di+1 = 0 D
′
i+1 = −1 (23)
Hi+1 = 0 H
′
i+1 = −1 (24)
We have ﬁxed some of the register values at this point. Additionally note that it is required
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that:
Δf i+1(0, 0, 1) = Δgi+1(0, 0, 1) (25)




Equations and Conditions for Step i+ 3
Here, both ΔEi+2 and ΔAi+2 are zeroes. Besides, we know that we want the message
to have no difference at this step. Hence, One may write:
ΔWi+2 = −Δf i+2(0, 1, 0), (26)
ΔWi+2 = −Δgi+2(0, 1, 0)
Considering the fact that both ΔHi+3 and ΔDi+3 should be zero in order for the equations
to hold, it can be inferred that:
−Δf i+2(0, 1, 0) = 0,
−Δgi+2(0, 1, 0) = 0
(27)
Now we can ﬁx some register values to assure this equation will hold. From Eq. 27, we
infer that Bi+2 = Ci+2 and also from the second term, we have Fi+2 = Hi+2. Notice that
this equalities can be propagated throughout the compression function. For instance, from
Eq. 15 and by noting that Bi+2 = Ci+2, we can infer that Bi+2 = Ci+2 = Ai+1 as well.
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Equations and Conditions for Step i+ 4
Based on the differential path, all differences ΔEi+3, ΔAi+3, ΔHi+4 and ΔDi+4 are
zero. Knowing that we want ΔWi+3 to be zero, we can write:
ΔWi+3 = −Δf i+3(1, 0, 0),
ΔWi+3 = −Δgi+3(1, 0, 0)
(28)
For Eq. 28 to hold, we inferCi+3 = Di+3. We also needGi+3 = Hi+3 so that the conditions
for the second term of Eq. 28 are met.
Equations and Conditions for Step i+ 5
In this step, it is required that all registers differences are zeroes, otherwise, we do not
have a collision. Additionally ΔEi+4 and ΔAi+4 are both one. Therefore, based on Eq. 17
one can infer:
ΔWi+4 = −1 (29)
We need to check this result with Eq. 19 as well to make sure there are no conﬂicts. Note
that using this equation we get the same result. Finally, from Eq. 21 and 29 we infer the
values for δ1 and δ2, respectively, as follows:
δ1 = −ΔSS1(Di+1)−Δf i+1(0, 0, 1),
δ2 = −1
(30)
Based on the DHA-256 hash function message expansion, assuming we start the differential
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M0
00000000 164A245D 00000000 C6A93DA7 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 BD75D069 00000000 8EC8BB70 00000000 4A3F0433 00000000
M ′0
00000000 164A245D 00000000 C6A93DA6 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 BD75D06A 00000000 8EC8BB6F 00000000 4A3F0433 00000000
H
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 00000000
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 00000000 FFFFFFFF
Table 7: The DHA-256 17 Step Collision found. In this table in each row, the message and
hash vector starts from the left and ﬁnishes at the end of the second line.
path in Table 6 from step 5, we note that each message will be used only once until step 17
and hence we have a collision on step 17. The results are shown in Table 7.
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Chapter 4
Cryptanalysis of the LAC Authenticated
Encryption Cipher
LAC was introduced in the CAESAR competition as a lightweight authenticated encryp-
tion cipher. The structure of LAC is based on ALE [7] and the primitive used in it as the
back-end block cipher is a modiﬁed version of LBlock [30] called LBlock-s which is an-
other lightweight cipher. In [7], the authors show that the probability of any characteristic
is bounded by 2−70 at most since the input-output difference transforms for the S-box have
probability bounded by 2−2 and the minimum number of active S-boxes for differential
paths is 35. However, the ciphers resistance against differential cryptanalysis can be at risk
if there exists many characteristics with high probability for some chosen candidate differ-
ential paths, i.e., the security bound is decreased in this case and the cipher can become
vulnerable to differential cryptanalysis. In this work, we present a cryptanalytic attack on
the LAC authenticated encryption cipher by using this information to ﬁnd characteristics
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with high probabilities for some candidate paths having the minimum number of active
S-boxes. In order to achieve this, truncated differentials with the highest probability are
derived. The minimum number of active S-boxes for each differential path is derived by
converting the LAC function operations into linear equations to represent their differential
behavior and then using a Mixed Integer Linear programming (MILP) approach to bound
the number of active S-boxes. Finally a collection of characteristics are selected based on
their input and output difference Hamming weights, minimum number of active S-boxes
for that path and their corresponding truncated differential probabilities. These are used to
ﬁnd the exact differentials which enables one to compare the lower bounds on the proba-
bility of the differentials. The differential paths found can be used in to launch a forgery
attack on LAC. Given the authenticated encryption (C, T ), and a message M , the goal of
our attack is to forge a valid ciphertext (C ′, T ) by using the differential characteristic that
hold with a high probability. Since the new ciphertext is valid, it can be decrypted to a
message M ′. Based on our experimental results, the probability of ﬁnding such ciphertext
is higher than the claimed value of 2−70, leading to security concerns for LAC. The main
objective of the following sections is to ﬁnd the paths with highest probability. In Section
4.7, characteristic paths with probability of ≈ 2−61.51 are found. The LAC authenticated
encryption cipher is explained in section 4.1. Afterwards, we show how the differential
behavior of the LAC authentication encryption operations are transformed into linear equa-
tions using the MILP algorithm and then we show how they are used to ﬁnd the minimum
number of active S-boxes in section 4.2.
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4.1 LAC Authenticated Encryption Cipher Speciﬁcation
LAC is a lightweight authenticated encryption cipher and is one of the candidates in the
CAESAR competition. It uses a structure similar to ALE and one of its primitive blocks is
a modiﬁed version of the LBlock cipher, called the LBlock-s function. The master key, K,
in the encryption and authentication algorithm is 80 bits long and the authentication tag τ
size in the output is 64 bits. At most 240 bits of data can be authenticated and/or encrypted
by using a master key with the same value. LAC has a nonce-respecting structure where
a 64 bit public message number PMN is used as nonce to encrypt the message data m
into the ciphertext c. The message m and its corresponding ciphertext c have the same
length. PMN is only used once for each master key in the encryption process. Finally an
associated data α is used in LAC with a variable length. The same variables are used in
the decryption process using the ciphertext c as the input and the message m as the output.
For authentication, the message m is returned only if the tag τ is correct and a special
symbol denoting the failure of authentication is sent otherwise. Four underlying blocks
are used for LAC encryption and authentication. These are the key scheduling algorithm
KS, a full 32 rounds LBlock-s E, a 16 round LBlock-s G and a 16 round LBlock-s G-leak
with 48 bits of leaked data state. All these blocks use LBlock-s as their basic function. In
the following sections, ﬁrst LBlock-s is explained and then these functions are illustrated.
The encryption and authentication procedure for LAC authenticated encryption cipher is
depicted in Fig. 4. In the following section we explain the LBlock-s cipher speciﬁcation





































Figure 4: The encryption and authentication process of LAC authenticated encryption ci-
pher
4.1.1 LBlock-s Speciﬁcation
LBlock-s is a modiﬁed version of the LBlock lightweight block cipher with a variant of
Feistel structure, 32 full rounds and a 64 bit data state as an input. The modiﬁcations are
performed so that the implementation cost are reduced. Therefore, all rounds are identical
in LBlock-s and there is no need to discard the switch operation in the last round of en-
cryption since no decryption of this function is needed in LAC. This leads to a less cost
of hardware control. Moreover, as opposed to LBlock which has 10 different S-boxes,
LBlock-s has one 4-bit S-box. Another difference is the number of left bit shifts performed
on the master key. In LBlock this number is 29 shifts which would be more costly to imple-
ment on 8 bit platforms whereas in LBlock-s, it is 24 bits which also improves the diffusion
effect. The round function for LBlock-s has three steps: subkey addition, confusion func-













Figure 5: One round of LBlock-s cipher with its round function subkey addition, confusion
and diffusion layers
i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
S(i) E 9 F 0 D 4 A B 1 2 8 3 7 6 C 5
Table 8: Input output pairs for the S-box used in LAC
round i is divided into two parts, Xi−1 and Xi−2, and the round function is performed on
these data states to get the data states Xi and Xi−1 for the next round i+ 1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ 33.
Therefore, X33||X32 would be the output after full 32 rounds for the input X1||X0 where
a||b denotes the concatenation of the two binary strings, a and b. In the subkey addition
step, each round subkey which is derived from the key scheduling algorithm explained in
section 4.1.2 is XORed with half of the data state. The 4-bit S-boxes are used in the con-
fusion step to provide data confusion by adding a non-linear layer. These parallel S-boxes
are all identical in LBlock-s and the input-output pairs are shown in Table 8. Finally, a
permutation is performed on eight nibbles in the diffusion step. Fig. 5 shows one round
of LBlock-s and the details of the round function. Therefore, the round function can be
described by Eq. 31 where 2 ≤ i ≤ 33.
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Xi = P (S(Xi−1 ⊕Ki−1))⊕ (Xi−2 <<< 8) (31)
4.1.2 The Key Scheduling Procedure in LAC and LBlock-s
For each round i, the leftmost 32 bits of the master key K are used as the subkey for that
round, subkeyi. The master key K is an 80 bit data, denoted [k79k78...k1k0]. Then the
master key K is updated for the next round subkey using the following procedures:
K <<< 24, where <<< denotes left bit shift with rotation.
[k55k54k53k52] = s[k79k78k77k76]⊕ [k55k54k53k52]
[k31k30k29k28] = s[k75k74k73k72]⊕ [k31k30k29k28]
[k67k66k65k64] = [k71k70k69k68]⊕ [k67k66k65k64]
[k51k50k49k48] = [k11k10k9k8]⊕ [k51k50k49k48]
[k54k53k52k51k50] = [k54k53k52k51k50]⊕ [i]2
The round subkey subkeyi+1 is the leftmost 32 bits of the current master key K, where [i]2
is the binary form of the round number i.
4.1.3 Speciﬁcation of E, G and G-leak Functions
The E function used in the LAC authenticated encryption cipher is a full 32 round LBlock-
s with X33||X32 acting as its output. However, the G function is a round reduced version of
LBlock-s with 16 rounds of iteration in both the encryption procedure and the key schedul-
ing algorithm. Therefore, the round equation for the G function would be as in Eq. 31
but with the condition that 2 ≤ i ≤ 17 with X17||X16 as the output. Finally the G-leak
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function is a 16 round LBlock-s with additional 48 bits of leaked internal data state. To
derive these leaked bits, ﬁrst, 9 rounds of LBlock-s is performed to get X9 from 2 ≤ i ≤ 9.
The higher 24 bits of X9 are saved as X9∗ which is X9[31, 30, · · · , 8] in bits. Then the next
8 rounds are performed from 10 ≤ i ≤ 17 in order to obtain X17. Similarly, the higher
24 bits of X17 are saved as X17∗ which is X17[31, 30, · · · , 8]. Eventually, X9∗||X17∗ is
saved as the leak bits as one output of this function where the data state X17||X16 acts as
the other output. The key scheduling algorithm is also modiﬁed for the G-leak function.
After deriving the subkeys for round numbers 2 to 16, using the same algorithm in KS
function, another ﬁnal round of key scheduling is performed from steps 1 to 7 but with
the round constant i = 0x15. In the following section, the encryption procedure in LAC
authenticated encryption cipher is explained.
4.1.4 Encryption and Decryption Procedures
The ﬁrst step in the encryption process in LAC authenticated encryption cipher is the mes-
sage padding. In this step, ﬁrst the smallest number x of zeros is appended to the messagem
where len is the message length and the condition (x+ len+40) mod 48 = 0; 0 ≤ x ≤ 48
is met. Then the message length len coded on 40 bits is appended such that the length of
the padded message is a multiple of 48 bits. Finally the padded message result is divided
into t 48-bit blocks denoted as M = m1||m2|| · · · ||mt−1||mt. Similarly, using the same
steps, the associated data α is padded and is divided into r blocks, each having 48 bits.
These blocks are denoted as A = a1||a2||...||ar−1||ar. The second step in the encryption
process is the initialization, in which both the initial key state and the data state for LAC
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are computed. As shown in Fig. 4, the public message number PMN (64 bits) and the
master key K (80 bits) are given as the input to the E function and its 64 bit output is en-
crypted one more time using the master key K. An internal 128 bits key denoted as Ukey
is constructed using the two 64-bit outputs in this step. The lower 80 least signiﬁcant bits
of the Ukey LSB are given as the initial key state to the KS functions and the higher 80
most signiﬁcant bits of the Ukey MSB are given as the initial data state. Note that this
initial data state is encrypted with 0 before being the input for the G functions. The third
step in the encryption procedure is to process the associated data. In the ﬁrst r rounds of
LAC, the key state and the data state are given as the input to the G function and the lower
48 bits of output (internal data state) is added (exclusive-ored) to the ﬁrst block (48 bits) of
the associated data. The fourth step in the encryption process is processing the message.
The output after the rth round along with the corresponding key state is used as the input
to the G-leak function which gives two outputs. One is the leaked bits and the other is the
internal data state. The internal data state is added to the lower 48 bits of the internal state
to provide the input for the next G-leak function. The leaked bits which are the higher 24
bits of output after 8 rounds and the higher 24 bits of output after 16 rounds are added to
the corresponding 48 message block denoted as mi in order to compute the corresponding
ciphertext block denoted as ci in Fig. 4. The last step in the encryption process is ﬁnal-
ization. The authentication tag for the message and the associated data τ is produced by
encrypting the ﬁnal data state using the master key K in function E. The decryption process
is performed similarly with the exception that the ciphertext c = c1|| · · · ||ct is given as the
input instead of the messagem. Also the tag received will be compared to the tag computed
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and, if not the same, an authentication failure symbol will be sent otherwise the decrypted
message will be sent.
4.2 Finding Differential Paths with Minimum Number of
Active S-boxes
In order to ﬁnd the minimum number of active S-boxes, we need to solve an optimization
problem by using the mixed integer linear programming technique explained in this section.
Then the minimum number is used to ﬁnd the candidate differential paths.
4.2.1 Mixed Integer Linear Programming
In order to compute the security bounds for the LAC authenticated encryption cipher
against differential cryptanalysis (i.e., to analyze how plaintext differences propagate in
ciphertext differences), a mixed integer linear programming method (MILP) is used in this
work. First, we derive linear equations representing the differential behavior of the op-
erations of the LAC authenticated encryption cipher given its structure as the input. The
goal in linear programming (LP) is to optimize an objective function (also linear) having
some conditions on the initial variables called the decision variables. We denote the lin-
ear objective function and decision variables as f(x1, x2, ..., xv−1, xv) and xi, respectively,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ v and v denotes the total number of variables. The optimization in here
is performed with the objective of minimizing the number of active S-boxes. We can use
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this bound to ﬁnd an upper bound for the probability of the best characteristic and there-
fore the best differential using the maximum differential probability (MDP) of the S-boxes.
Therefore, when these equations, which deﬁne the differential behavior of each of the LAC
authenticated encryption ciphers operations, are given as input to an MILP solver, we can
get the minimum number of active S-boxes for LAC as the output. In this work the Ip-
solver [1] has been used for solving the optimization problem. For candidate differential
paths, the minimum number of active S-boxes for full 16 rounds of LAC authenticated
encryption cipher has been calculated. Note that the decision variables xi can have ﬁxed
integer values as conditions. The term MILP is used when some of the decision variables
should be integer values and ILP term or pure linear programming is used when all of them
should have integer values. In the following section, we demonstrate how MILP can be
used to derive the minimum number of active S-boxes for a speciﬁc differential path.
4.3 Converting the Differential Behaviors of LAC Opera-
tions into Linear Equations
In this section we explain how the minimum number of active S-boxes is calculated using
the MILP technique. First, the linear equations representing the differential behavior of
the operations of the LAC authenticated encryption cipher are derived knowing that the G
function in LAC is constructed using exclusive-or, rotational nibble shifts, confusion layers
(S-box operations) and permutation layers. We denote the total number of input vector
nibbles as nb. In the following section, we explain how the differential behavior of each of
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these operations are converted into linear equations for the LAC authenticated encryption
cipher. In order to do so, we use truncated differences as the input difference vector, i.e.,
having the difference vector x = (x0, x1, · · · , xnb), then xi = 0 only if the corresponding
nibble has the difference 0 as well. Otherwise the difference is one. Therefore, it is assumed
that each nibble in the G function input can be either 0 or 1, i.e., each nibble has either a
zero difference or a non-zero difference. These differences are called truncated differences.
After deriving the linear equations for the G block of LAC authenticated encryption cipher,
the objective function is determined; the objective function here would be the number of
active S-boxes which is the summation of all the variables in equations that are given as
an input to the confusion layer of the G function. Finally, to assure that the optimized
result found from solving the equations does not contain the case where all the variables
are zero and therefore the minimum number of active S-boxes is zero, we add an additional
constraint that at least one S-box is active. We can achieve this by adding the constraint
that the summation of all variables given as input to the confusion layer should be greater
than or equal to one.
4.3.1 The Exclusive-or Operation Conversion
Let us assume the input difference vector entering the exclusive-or operation is [x1xor, x2xor]
and its corresponding output is xoutxor. In this operation, the minimum number of input and
output bytes that have differences is 2. We denote this number as the differential branch
number. Note that the case where the input and output differences are all zero is not consid-
ered in ﬁnding this minimum. Therefore a dummy variable dxor is deﬁned to demonstrate
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the differential branch number in the ﬁnal linear equations corresponding to exclusive-or
operation. The only case where this dummy variable dxor is zero is when all variables
x1
xor, x2xor and xoutxor are zero. The linear equations for the connection between input
and output difference vector in exclusive-or operation are given by Eq. 32 where all these









4.3.2 The Linear Operation Conversion
A linear operation is any operation that upon reception of an input vector [xl1, xl2, · · · , xlnb−1
, xlnb], transforms it linearly to an output vector [xlout1, xlout2, · · · , xloutn−1, xloutn]. Similar
to the exclusive-or operation, the differential branch number B and the dummy variable dl
are used to demonstrate the connection between the differential input and output vectors.
Likewise, only if all the variables xl1, xl2, · · · , xlnb, xlout1, xlout2, · · · ,
xloutn−1 and xloutn are zero, then the dummy variable dl would be zero. Otherwise, it will
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Note that ﬁnding the optimized result of the derived linear equations, we can restrict all
dummy variables and input or output variables to be binary. In that case we need integer
linear programming to ﬁnd the optimized result. In the following section, we illustrate
the construction of the MILP problem for the LAC authenticated encryption cipher, the
calculation of the minimum number of active S-boxes for our differential path and how the
differential cryptanalysis is performed using this technique.
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4.4 Differential Cryptanalysis of LAC Authenticated En-
cryption Cipher Using the MILP Algorithm
In this section, we show how to construct the linear equations for the differential behavior
of the LAC authenticated encryption cipher and then use these equations to ﬁnd the mini-
mum number of active S-boxes for several candidate differential paths. The variables used
in the equations are in the form of mixed-integer equations, i.e., the decision variables are
integer values. Therefore, this problem is an MILP problem and we use IPsolver to ﬁnd
the optimized result of the derived linear equations. The result of this step would be the
minimization of the objective function which is the minimum number of active S-boxes
for the given differential input vector to the speciﬁc output vector in the differential path
for the 16 round LAC authenticated encryption cipher. This is used to perform differential
cryptanalysis on the LAC authenticated encryption cipher by ﬁnding an actual characteris-
tic with that given number of active S-boxes. Note that the S-box will output a non zero
output difference only if the input difference is a non zero value. Therefore, we can map
any active difference in the input to the output and keep the rest as a zero difference. The
G function in LAC has one exclusive-or operation with inputs other than the subkey vari-
ables. Here we demonstrate the propagation of the difference vectors in LAC by forming
the linear equations corresponding to these operations starting from the ﬁrst round as an
example. As depicted in Fig. 6, we denote the variables in the input difference vector by
the binary values x0 to x15. Therefore, the initial left side input difference vector would
be [x0, x1 · · · , x6, x7] and similarly the initial right side input difference vector would be
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[x8, x9, · · · , x14, x15]. The left side vector will be the next round right side vector and
therefore the variables x0 to x7 will be on the right side for the next round. However, in
order to construct next round left side vector, these variables should pass by the S-boxes.
Since the S-box is bijective, it will transform any non-zero difference to another non-zero
difference and hence every difference in the S-box input will be passed to the output and
any zero difference will not. Next, these differences will be permuted and we apply these
permutations in the S-box output as shown in Fig. 6. This vector will be used as one of
the inputs for the exclusive-or operation of LAC authenticated encryption cipher which we
will use in deﬁning the linear equations. The right side vector corresponding to the vari-
ables x8 to x15 will be shifted 8 bits to the left with rotation and the resulting vector is
the second input to the exclusive-or operation of the LAC authenticated encryption cipher.
Therefore the two vectors given as input to the exclusive-or operation in the ﬁrst round of
LAC are [x1, x3, x0, x2, x5, x7, x4, x6] and [x10, x11, x12, x13, x14, x15, x8, x9] corresponding
to the permutation output and 8 bit left rotation shift, respectively. We now deﬁne new
binary variables x16 to x23 to denote the output corresponding to the input vectors for the
exclusive-or operation. Note that these variables will be the left side vector for the next
round since they are the result of the exclusive-or operation. By deﬁning another new
dummy variable, d0, we can write down the linear equations for this round and for input
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variables x1 and x10 as follow:





Similarly, considering the other exclusive-or operations in this round for other variables,
we can get 8 × 4 = 32 equations for the ﬁrst round since we get 4 equations for each
exclusive-or operation and we have eight nibbles for the inputs to the exclusive-or opera-
tion. Therefore, for the new variables x17, x18, x19, x20, x21, x22 and x23, similar equations
with dummy variables d1, d2, d3, d4, d5, d6, d7 are written and a system of 32 equations are
used to describe all the operation for each round of the G function for LAC. This set of
equations is given in the following form for round r = 0:





for i = 0, . . . , 7 where arrays k = [1, 3, 0, 2, 5, 7, 4, 6], m = [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 8, 9] and
n = [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. As shown in Fig. 6, after one round, the propagated
differences will be [x16, x17, x18, x19, x20, x21, x22, x23] and [x0, x1, · · · , x6, x7] for the left
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side and right side, respectively. The same process can be performed on every round of
the LAC authenticated encryption cipher and therefore the whole structures differential
behavior can be written as a system of linear equations with new deﬁned binary variables.
The overall set of conditions for rounds r = 1, . . . , 15 can be written as:





for i = 0, . . . , 7 where arrays k = [1, 3, 0, 2, 5, 7, 4, 6], m = [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 8, 9] and
n = [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. This, along with Eq. (35), give a set of 16×8×4 = 512
linear equations. In the following section, we describe how these linear equations are used
in order to ﬁnd the minimum number of active S-boxes for several candidate differential
paths.
4.4.1 Finding the Minimum Number of Active S-boxes
In order to determine the minimum number of active S-boxes, we need to consider the
variables in our linear inequalities that are given as input to the S-boxes in each round of
the G function since these are the variables that determine if an S-box is active or not.
For example, in round one, we can see that the variables x0, x1, · · · , x6, x7 represent the
S-box inputs so that these are the variables in the equations that should be considered in
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Figure 6: Differential propagation for the ﬁrst step of LAC in initialization of the linear
equations
our optimization problem. Note that we need to have an additional linear equation for the
summation of these variables to be greater than or equal to one since we do not want the
result where there is no active S-box. We denote the set of 8 variables determining the
S-box inputs in round i as the set Li and since the G function has 16 rounds, then we can
conclude that 1 ≤ i ≤ 16. Therefore, the sets for the LAC authenticated encryption cipher
can be described as in Eq. 38. The number of active S-boxes kN for a total of N rounds of








Our objective would be to optimize, i.e., minimize, kN . Having 32 linear equations in each
round plus one additional equation for the S-box constraint forN rounds, we have a system
of 32N +1 linear equations with binary variables (an ILP program). In this work, IPSolver
is used for optimizing the equations according to the objective function. The minimum
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number of active S-boxes for different candidate differential paths is compared and the
results are shown in Table 9. In the following sections, we explain how these candidate
paths were chosen for our experiment.
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L0 = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
L1 = 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
L2 = 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31,
L3 = 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39,
L4 = 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47,
L5 = 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55,
L6 = 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63,
L7 = 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71,
L8 = 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79,
L9 = 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87,
L10 = 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95,
L11 = 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103,
L12 = 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111,
L13 = 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119,
L14 = 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127,
L15 = 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135,
L16 = 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143.
(38)
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4.5 Choosing the Candidate Truncated Characteristics
To choose the candidate truncated characteristics, the following steps have been taken.
First, we generate a matrix of the probabilities of all the possible truncated differentials
of LAC over one round assuming its F-function is a random permutation. In truncated
differentials, each nibble is either active (set to 1) or inactive (set to 0). Therefore, the size
of this matrix is 216 × 216. Then using MATLAB, we raised this matrix to the power of 16
so that we have the probabilities of the truncated differentials over 16 rounds. Afterwards,
as LAC does not permit the manipulation of its whole 16-nibbles internal state, i.e., just 12
nibbles. We focused our attention on a truncated matrix of size 212 × 212. In this truncated
matrix, we searched for the entry that has the maximum probability corresponding to all
possible input and output Hamming weights. Hence, after this step we ended up with
12 × 12 patterns corresponding to all the possible input and output Hamming weights
and the maximum probability corresponding to each pattern. Using the MILP technique,
we found the truncated characteristic corresponding to each of these 144 patterns and the
number of active S-boxes for each truncated characteristic. The list of patterns was shorten
by setting the number of active S-boxes to be 35, i.e., the minimum number of active S-
boxes in 16 rounds. From the truncated difference matrix, we know if each nibble is active
or not for the input pattern and the output pattern only and we do not know how this input
difference pattern was propagated to reach the corresponding output difference pattern.
This is what is called a differential, i.e., just the input difference and the output difference
after some speciﬁc rounds. In a characteristic, we have the intermediate difference patterns
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as well and that is what we get from the MILP and IP Solver. Then for this short list of
truncated characteristics, we ﬁnd the corresponding differential with the highest probability
as explained in the next section.
4.6 Finding the Differential of the highest Probability
In this section, we explain the algorithm of turning the truncated characteristics we obtained
in the previous section into differentials with speciﬁc input and output difference values. To
speed up the algorithm, we restrict the number of active nibbles in each round. In particular,
we restrict the input to have 3 active nibbles at most, the intermediate rounds to have 6
active nibbles in total and the number of active nibbles that pass by an S-box is limited to
3 out of these 6 active nibbles in each round. For a given truncated characteristic D, we
have so many possibilities for the differences at the input, intermediate rounds and output.
For a speciﬁc input/output difference pair, we consider all the possible differences in the
intermediate round following our truncated characteristic D. This determines a group of
characteristics that contribute to the same differential. Computing the sum of probabilities
of those characteristics give a more accurate lower bound of the differential probability. We
used the algorithm proposed in [21]. We denote a version of D with only i rounds as Di.
To compute P (D : α −→ β) for a given (α, β), we ﬁrst compute the P (Di : α −→ x)
for all the differences x following D1. Then P (Di : α −→ x) is iteratively built for all x
75
Truncated Truncated Probabilityof Numberof input output Probability
Input Output Truncated Active difference difference of
Difference Difference Differential Sboxes value value Differential
[0000000000001101] [0000011000001100] 2.75E − 15 35 [0000000000007604] [0000044000002400] 2−61.73
[0000000000001101] [0000111000001100] 4.12E − 14 35 [0000000000007604] [0000442000004200] 2−61.83
[0000101000000001] [0000101100000000] 1.83E − 16 35 [0000404000000004] [0000706400000000] 2−61.51
Table 9: The result characteristics with the minimum number of active S-boxes and the
highest probability corresponding to the input and output difference values for the full 16
round of LAC authenticated encryption cipher
following Di using the results from Di−1:
P (Di : α −→ x) =
∑
x′
P (Di−1 : α −→ x′)× P (x′ ←→ x) (39)
The results are presented in the following section.
4.7 Results
In this section, the result for each candidate truncated characteristic is shown in Table 9
in terms of the minimum number of active S-boxes and the probability of the truncated
differential derived from the truncated difference table matrix. In this table, the probability
of truncated differential is the probability from the truncated difference table matrix. The
minimum number of active S-boxes corresponding to the truncated input difference and
the truncated output difference is shown for the full 16 rounds of LAC, and probability
of differential is the differential with the highest probability for the input difference and
output difference, and ﬁnally the input and output difference values are the differentials
determining the exact value of the nibbles.
Each digit in the truncated input difference shows whether that nibble is active or not.
As an example [0000000000101101] means the nibbles 10, 12, 13 and 15 are active in the
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input and the other nibbles are inactive. Note that the right most nibble stands for the
15th nibble and the leftmost nibble is the 0th nibble in this representation. Similarly in the
input and output representation, each digit shows the value for that nibble. As an example
[0000000000007604]means that the 15th nibble has a difference of value 4. The 13th nibble
has a difference of value 6 and the 12th nibble has a difference of value 7. From the above
results, one conclude that the underlying block cipher makes LAC susceptible to forgery
attacks where forged messages can be produced by utilizing the found differentials which
hold with relatively high probability than what is claimed by the cipher designers.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
Block ciphers, hash functions and authenticated encryption schemes are important sym-
metric key primitives that are used as building blocks in many security applications. This
thesis focused on the cryptanalysis of some of these primitives including the Lesamnta-512
and DHA-256 hash functions, and the LAC authenticated encryption schemes.
In particular, we investigated the resistance of the Lesamnta-512 underlying block ci-
pher against impossible differential attacks and studied the resistance of the DHA-256 com-
pression function against collision attacks. Furthermore, we studied the resistance of LAC
against forgery attacks that utilize high probability differentials in its underlying block ci-
pher.
We can further continue the current work in the following directions:
1. In this work, we only considered the underlying block cipher of Lesamnta-512. For
future research, the implications of the developed key recovery techniques can be
extended to Lesamnta when used in the secret key set-up to construct different MAC
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schemes.
2. One can study how to improve the results provided in this thesis, for example by ex-
tending the number of attacked rounds or improving the complexity of the presented
attacks.
3. The impossible differential cryptanalysis applied to Lesamnta-512 can be performed
on other hash functions to investigate the security margin of their underlying block
ciphers.
4. The so-called automated techniques that were used throughout the thesis still require
a lot of manual expert intervention in order to be applied to a speciﬁc block cipher
or hash function. Further automation of these techniques is a very interesting and
challenging research project that can have a large impact on the analysis and design
of symmetric key systems.
5. The automated methods that were used throughout the thesis have the limitations
that they cannot be applied to many ciphers because of their inherent computational
complexity. Improving the computational efﬁciency of these automated cryptanalysis
methods and developing new ones is another interesting research direction.
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